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Introduction
The American legal system is failing us. Recent media attention has
broadcasted the devastation that police officers inflict on Black
communities. The Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement, as portrayed
in the media, is a movement that pushed conversation on police
brutality and the murder of Black people to the forefront of American
consciousness.1 Although stories of individual police officers brutalizing
Black people are what the media focuses on, the entire criminal-justice
system should be scrutinized.2 Though often overlooked, prosecutors
play a central role in perpetuating the legal system’s systemic failings.
When prosecutors engage in misconduct and violate the Constitution,
innocent people end up paying with their lives.3 It is irrelevant that
prosecutors themselves are not pulling the trigger—imprisoning
someone for a crime they did not commit destroys lives just as
effectively.4

1.

Andrew Perrin, 23% of Users in U.S. Say Social Media Led Them to
Change Views on an Issue; Some Cite Black Lives Matter, Pew Rsch.
Ctr. (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/10/
15/23-of-users-in-us-say-social-media-led-them-to-change-views-on-issuesome-cite-black-lives-matter/ [https://perma.cc/A5YZ-T24U]; see also 330
Names, Stan. Librs., https://exhibits.stanford.edu/saytheirnames/feature/
330-names [https://perma.cc/YYN7-FDLM] (last visited Jan. 23, 2022)
(listing the names of 330 victims of racial violence).

2.

Paul Butler, Chokehold: Policing Black Men and Women in America,
Guardian (Aug. 11, 2017, 7:00), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2017/aug/11/chokehold-police-black-men-paul-butler-race-america.
[https://perma.cc/J3DP-NQHE]; see also Mass Incarceration and Racial
Oppression, Innocence Project New Orleans, https://ip-no.org/
what-we-do/advocate-for-change/mass-incarceration-and-racial-oppression/
[https://perma.cc/UN2J-YT94] (last visited Jan. 23, 2022) (“Since the
gains of the civil rights movement became apparent, economic interests
and political pressure to imprison millions of Americans has steadily but
rapidly replaced segregation with mass incarceration. This has grossly
overburdened the legal institutions that make up the criminal justice
system and has caused police, lawyers, courts and prisons to resort to
assembly-line justice.”).

3.

Kate Levine & Joanna Schwartz, Hold Prosecutors Accountable, Too, Bos.
Rev. (Jun. 18, 2020), https://bostonreview.net/law-justice/kate-levinejoanna-schwartz-hold-prosecutors-accountable-too [https://perma.cc/X9UF8HAZ].

4.

Id.
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I.

Winning at All Costs: Prosecutorial Misconduct
Violates the Constitution and Destroys Lives

It is not solely police misconduct that needs to be scrutinized, but
the misconduct of prosecutors as well. Prosecutorial misconduct often
results in wrongful conviction and incarceration, an egregious violation
that has devastating effects on the innocent victim. Wrongfully
incarcerated individuals are deprived of freedom and placed into the
dangerous environment of jail or prison, where death—whether by
suicide, correctional officer abuse or brutality, or another inmate—is all
too likely.5 After police arrest someone, prosecutors may, at their own
discretion, charge the arrestee and put them on trial to prove their
guilt.6 Prosecutors have dual roles; when prosecutors build their case,
they are working as investigators.7 When prosecutors believe the case
against a defendant is strong enough to move forward, prosecution
begins. Prosecutors then become advocates for the victims of the crime.8
“Prosecutorial misconduct occurs when a prosecutor breaks a law
or a code of professional ethics” when trying a case.9 The result of prosecutorial misconduct can include the imprisonment of innocent people,
who serve terms of decades or even life in prison for crimes they did not
commit. 10 Despite the devastation of incarceration, prosecutorial-

5.

See E. Ann Carson, U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. NCJ 256002, Mortality
in Local Jails, 2000-2018 – Statistical Tables 1–3 (2021) (“In 2018,
a total of 1,120 inmates died in local jails, an increase of nearly 2% from
the 1,099 deaths reported in 2017.”).

6.

See Daniel C. Richman, Law Enforcement Organization Relationships
with Prosecutors, in The Oxford Handbook of Prosecutors and
Prosecution 291, 293 (Ronald F. Wright et al. eds., 2021).

7.

See id. at 294 (detailing some of the steps prosecutors take during the
investigation stage, such as negotiating plea deals with accomplices in
exchange for vital information).

8.

Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005
BYU L. Rev. 53, 54.

9.

Prosecutorial Misconduct, Cal. Innocence Project, https://
californiainnocenceproject.org/issues-we-face/prosecutorial-misconduct/
[https://perma.cc/DJC3-URAP] (last visited Jan. 23, 2022); Emma Zack,
Why Holding Prosecutors Accountable Is So Difficult, Innocence Project
(Apr. 23, 2020) https://innocenceproject.org/why-holding-prosecutorsaccountable-is-so-difficult/ [https://perma.cc/KQM3-CT8G]; see also
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 89 (1935) (awarding a new trial because
the prosecuting attorney’s misconduct was “pronounced and persistent,
with a probable cumulative effect upon the jury”).

10.

See Zack, supra note 9.

841

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 3·2022
The Next Step in Civil Rights

misconduct cases typically end the same way police-officer misconduct
cases do11: with no accountability, and no justice.
One of the most notorious cases of prosecutorial misconduct
happened in New Orleans in 2011. John Thompson, a 22-year-old Black
man, was arrested for two separate crimes, an armed robbery and a
murder. 12 During the armed-robbery trial, the prosecution withheld
exculpatory evidence that could have proven Thompson’s innocence.
The perpetrator’s blood was found at the crime scene and was not a
match to Thompson. 13 When Thompson’s trial for murder began,
Thompson did not take the stand because the prosecutor likely would
have impeached his credibility by introducing evidence of his armedrobbery conviction. Thus, Thompson’s co-defendant testified that
Thompson committed the murder without any rebuttal from
Thompson.14 The prosecution’s deliberate failure to disclose the critical
blood evidence in his armed-robbery trial led to Thompson’s wrongful
convictions and sentences of forty-nine-and-a-half years in prison for
armed robbery and the death penalty for murder.15 He spent the next
eighteen years of his life in prison, from ages twenty-two to forty.
Thompson spent fourteen of those years in a windowless cell, waiting
for his execution.16 In the years Thompson spent on death row, his
lawyer hired a private investigator to look into the case.17 The PI unearthed the exculpatory DNA evidence, which a Louisiana appellate
court used to reverse Thompson’s murder conviction.18 Thompson was

11.

German Lopez, Cops Are Almost Never Prosecuted and Convicted for Use of
Force, Vox, https://www.vox.com/identities/2016/8/13/17938234/policeshootings-killings-prosecutions-court [https://perma.cc/6E7W-EPNC] (Nov.
14, 2018, 4:12 PM); see, e.g., Ashley Southall, Ali Watkins & Blacki Migliozzi,
A Watchdog Accused Officers of Serious Misconduct. Few Were Punished.,
N.Y. Times (Nov. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/15/
nyregion/ccrb-nyc-police-misconduct.html [https://perma.cc/A5MQ-G34S].

12.

Sam Roberts, John Thompson, Cleared After 14 Years on Death Row,
Dies at 55, N.Y. Times (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
10/04/obituaries/john-thompson-cleared-after-14-years-on-death-rowdies-at-55.html [https://perma.cc/38XY-9RA2]. Thompson was one of two
co-defendants in the murder case. Id.

13.

Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 54–56 (2011).

14.

Id. at 55; see also State v. Thompson (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/17/02); 825 So.
2d 552, 556 (concluding that Thompson “would have testified in the absence
of the attempted armed robbery conviction”).

15.

Thompson, 563 U.S. at 85–87 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

16.

Roberts, supra note 12.

17.

Thompson, 563 U.S. at 87–89 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); State v.
Thompson, 2002-0361 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/17/02), 825 So. 2d 552, 558,
certiorari denied, 2002-2203 (La. 11/15/02), 829 So. 2d 427.

18.

Id. at 87, 89.
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finally able to walk free after about eighteen years.19 After this story
unfolded, even more exculpatory evidence came to light; the prosecution
had hidden ten other pieces of evidence before his trial that cast serious
doubt on Thompson’s guilt.20
Although finally free, Thompson was unable to hold the people
responsible for his wrongful incarceration accountable. Prosecutors have
absolute immunity from suits alleging prosecutorial misconduct. 21
Because that immunity precludes suits against individual prosecutors
for their misconduct, Thompson tried to hold the District Attorney’s
office accountable for the role it played in his wrongful incarceration,
but the Supreme Court blocked him in Connick v. Thompson. 22
Thompson successfully sued the DA’s office for misconduct in district
court and was awarded $14 million in damages,23 and an evenly divided
en banc Fifth Circuit affirmed.24 But the Supreme Court reversed.25 In
doing so, the Supreme Court effectively granted municipalities their
own form of qualified immunity, making it extremely difficult for
Thompson and similarly situated future plaintiffs to hold prosecutors
liable for their misconduct.26
A.

A Few Bad Apples vs. A Rotten Orchard: The Issue is Systemic

Connick is not an isolated incident, but rather a well-litigated
example of the magnitude of damage that prosecutorial misconduct can
cause. Several studies decisively show the systemic destruction caused
by prosecutorial misconduct. The National Registry of Exonerations
reports that misconduct by prosecutors or police officers occurred in
56% of the 2,946 exoneration cases between 1989 and 2022. 27 On

19.

Roberts, supra note 12. The jury deliberated for 35 minutes. Id.

20.

John Thompson (1962-2017), Witness to Innocence, https://www.
witnesstoinnocence.org/single-post/john-thompson [https://perma.cc/NP8F3ZJ8] (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).

21.

Levine & Schwartz, supra note 3.

22.

563 U.S. 51 (2011).

23.

Id. at 54.

24.

Id.

25.

Id.

26.

See id. at 60–62 (finding that a plaintiff may only prevail in a § 1983
claim based on a local-government employee’s actions when the municipality
is “on actual or constructive notice that a particular omission in [its] training
program causes city employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights.”).

27.

% of Exonerations by Contributing Factor, The Nat’l Registry of
Exonerations, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/
ExonerationsContribFactorsByCrime.aspx [https://perma.cc/P54K-GHFK]
(last visited Feb. 2, 2022). This table is updated regularly.
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average, wrongfully incarcerated individuals lose nearly eleven years of
their lives in prison per case.28
Prosecutorial misconduct exists on a spectrum, just like police misconduct does. For example, with police misconduct, the Fourth Amendment only protects people from state actors’ excessive use of force, but
officers can abuse their position by harming individuals in ways that do
not go far enough to be considered a constitutional violation but are
still harmful.29 The prosecutorial-misconduct spectrum includes prejudicial or biased statements, unethical trial and pre-trial tactics, as well as
the more serious forms of misconduct, such as “[k]nowingly permitting
perjury” and “[l]ying in court.”30 No matter the degree, any form of
misconduct is damaging to our criminal justice system: it “undermines
public confidence” and discredits the “truth-seeking” process.31
But not every form of misconduct is a violation of our constitutional
rights. The most common forms of misconduct that rise to the level of
constitutional violations include: witness tampering (occurring in 17%
of cases of exoneration), concealing exculpatory evidence (occurring in
44% of cases), and misconduct in trial (occurring in more than 14% of
cases). 32 That second category—concealing exculpatory evidence—is
the most common type of misconduct in cases that eventually result in
exoneration. The Supreme Court has held that concealing exculpatory
evidence is particularly egregious.33
In the seminal case of Brady v. Maryland,34 the Supreme Court held
that the Constitution demands that the government disclose favorable
evidence to criminal defendants.35 The government’s failure to disclose
28.

Map of Exonerations in the United States, The Nat’l Registry of
Exonerations, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/
Exonerations-in-the-United-States-Map.aspx [https://perma.cc/UUH65TH3] (last visited Feb. 2, 2022). This map is updated regularly.

29.

E.g., Allen v. Harry, No. 07-CV-15481, 2010 WL 538297, at *5–6 (E.D. Mich.
Feb. 10, 2010) (stating that is was improper, but not unconstitutional, for
the police to intimidate witnesses by threatening to send them to juvenile
detention, call them expletives, and slap them (quoting Michigan v. Allen,
2002 WL 31934025 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2002))).

30.

Maurice J. Possley, Kaitlin Jackson Roll & Klara Huber Stephens,
Nat’l Registry of Exonerations, Government Misconduct and
Convicting the Innocent 33 (Samuel R. Gross ed., 2020) (reporting
on all known exonerations in the United States from 1989 to 2019).

31.

Aimee Ortiz, Police or Prosecutor Misconduct Is at Root of Half of
Exoneration Cases, Study Finds, N.Y. Times (Sept. 16, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/09/16/us/exonerations-report-misconduct.html
[https://perma.cc/3WFU-MXTC].

32.

Possley et al., supra note 30, at 30–33.

33.

See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 59 (2011).

34.

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

35.

Id. at 87.
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favorable evidence violates a defendant’s due-process rights.36 Note that
Brady and its progeny allow prosecutors to exercise a high degree of
independence, requiring disclosure only for “favorable” and “material”
evidence. The flexibility of these terms allows for extreme deference to
prosecutors’ determinations of what is “favorable” and “material,”
which prosecutors can use to disadvantage the defense.37 Despite the
severe impact a Brady violation can have on a defendant, the only
available remedy is a reversal—a pittance of a punishment on the
prosecutor when weighed against the devastating impact of imprisoning
an innocent person.38
Simply looking at the data on frequency of prosecutorial misconduct
doesn’t shed much light on the question of its prevalence. Although the
issue of prosecutorial misconduct is clear enough for legal scholars to
declare it a widespread issue (and not the result of a few “bad apples”),39
the severity of the orchard rot is not as obvious. The only readily available data comes from studies examining exonerations, which show that
more than half of exonerations are the result of prosecutorial misconduct.40 Based on this, legal scholars suspect a significant number of
cases plagued by prosecutorial misconduct remain hidden.41 One judge
in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals—the highest appellate court
for criminal appeals in the state—estimated 60% of cases in his court
involved a claim of prosecutorial misconduct.42 This data and information all suggest that the issue of misconduct is a widespread problem.
Prosecutors’ unique powers make their misconduct particularly
damaging. Because prosecutors work on behalf of the state, they may
36.

Id. at 86–87; Elizabeth Napier Dewar, Note, A Fair Trial Remedy for
Brady Violations, 115 Yale L.J. 1450, 1452 (2006).

37.

Kevin C. McMunigal, The Craft of Due Process, 45 St. Louis U. L.J.
477, 487 (2001) (explaining that the Supreme Court subsequently defined
the term “material” narrowly to require prosecutors to turn over only
evidence with “particularly high probative value” (discussing United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 681–84 (1985))).

38.

John P. Taddei, Beyond Absolute Immunity: Alternative Protections for
Prosecutors Against Ultimate Liability for § 1983 Suits, 106 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 1883, 1899 (2012).

39.

Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial
Judges, 50 Tex. L. Rev. 629, 631 (1972); see also Levine & Schwartz,
supra note 3 (describing prosecutorial misconduct as “an epidemic”).

40.

See Debra Cassens Weiss, Police and Prosecutor Misconduct Contributed
to Over Half of False-Conviction Cases, New Study Finds, ABA Journal
(Sept. 16, 2020, 1:32 PM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
police-and-prosecutor-misconduct-contributed-to-over-half-of-falseconviction-cases-study-finds [https://perma.cc/3PXZ-UJTU] (discussing
Possley et al., supra note 30, and stating that it measures prosecutorial
misconduct in exoneration cases—not prosecutorial misconduct generally).

41.

Ortiz, supra note 31.

42.

Alschuler, supra note 39.
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have access to the crime scene, to lab reports, to the discussions taking
place in interrogation, etc.43 If prosecutors are not honest or if they hide
or tamper with evidence over which they have control, there is no way
for anyone to know. In most cases of serious misconduct, the defendant
likely has no knowledge that a potentially exculpatory piece of evidence
exists that could free them from a life of wrongful imprisonment.44
B.

Our Judicial System is Failing Us—Why Internal Remedies
Do Not Work

With potentially high levels of misconduct in our judicial system,
it may be surprising that most charges of misconduct go unpunished.
This is because the existing remedies for prosecutorial misconduct are
weak and ineffective.
1.

Appellate Reversal

Appellate reversal is better suited as a remedy to ensure the fairness
of a defendant’s trial than as a way to punish prosecutorial misconduct.45 The appellate court will disturb a guilty verdict only when the
misconduct was not cured by jury instruction or was “harmless”
because other evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty.46
Affirming a guilty verdict despite “harmless” prosecutorial misconduct
does not deter future misconduct in any meaningful sense.47 When the
43.

See Nat’l Res. & Tech. Assistance Ctr. for Improving L. Enf’t
Investigations, & Nat’l Crim. Just. Training Ctr. Fox Valley
Tech. Coll., Investigating Violent Crime: The Prosecutor’s
Role 4, 7, 14–15 (2018), https://crimegunintelcenters.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/09/Investigating-Violent-Crime-The-Prosecutors-RoleLessons-Learned-from-the-Field-NRTAC-June-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/
KUS6-EK9Q] (describing the various roles prosecutors can play depending
on police practice).

44.

David Keenan, Deborah Jane Cooper, David Lebowitz & Tamar Lerer,
The Myth of Prosecutorial Accountability After Connick v. Thompson:
Why Existing Professional Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect Against
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 Yale L.J. Online 203, 209 & n.36 (2011–
2012), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-myth-of-prosecutorialaccountability-after-connick-v-thompson-why-existing-professionalresponsibility-measures-cannot-protect-against-prosecutorial-misconduct;
see Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power,
and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 393, 412 (2001) (noting
that “[t]he victim of [prosecutorial] misconduct may be wholly aware of
its occurrence”); Barbara O’Brien, A Recipe for Bias: An Empirical Look
at the Interplay Between Institutional Incentives and Bounded Rationality
in Prosecutorial Decision Making, 74 Mo. L. Rev. 999, 1010, 1039–40,
1040 n.155 (2009) (explaining that defendants have limited access to
information compared to prosecutors).

45.

Alschuler, supra note 39, at 645.

46.

Id.

47.

Id.
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court does find error, appellate review may serve as a deterrent—at
least to the extent that prosecutors do not want their convictions
overturned.48 However, reversal focuses on the effect the conduct has on
justice for the criminal defendant, not on punishing the prosecutor for
the misconduct.49 Additionally, if there is no trial, then there is nothing
to review.50 Because only 2% of federal cases go to trial, appellate review
is not an option in most cases.51
2.

Professional Discipline and Criminal Charges

Because the legal profession is self-policing, professional discipline
should be an effective deterrent to misconduct. But internal disciplinary
methods do not deter because they are rarely used. Between 1970 and
2000, only 2% of alleged prosecutorial misconduct resulted in some form
of discipline.52
The federal government can also bring criminal charges under 18
U.S.C. § 242 against state actors who violate people’s constitutional
rights. 53 States can likewise criminalize prosecutorial misconduct. 54
However, since 1866, only one prosecutor has been convicted under

48.

Id. at 646–47.

49.

Id. at 645–46.

50.

Jonathan Harwell, Marshall Jensen, Sarah Heath Olesiuk, & Sally B.
Seraphin, Righteous Indignation: Prosecutorial Misconduct, Brady, and
the Cognitive Limits of Self-Policing, 87 Tenn. L. Rev. 715, 753–55 (2020).

51.

John Gramlich, Only 2% of Federal Criminal Defendants Go to Trial,
and Most Who Do Are Found Guilty, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (June 11, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/11/only-2-of-federalcriminal-defendants-go-to-trial-and-most-who-do-are-found-guilty/
[https://perma.cc/PB86-7U83]; see also Quattrone Ctr., Univ. of Pa.
Carey L. Sch., Hidden Hazards: Prosecutorial Misconduct
Claims in Pennsylvania, 2000–2016, at 6 & n.5 (2021), https://www.law.
upenn.edu/live/files/11857-hidden-hazards-prosecutorial-misconductclaims-in (noting that roughly 98% of criminal cases in Pennsylvania,
excluding those in Philadelphia, “end[ed] in guilty pleas” or “were
diverted, withdrawn, or dismissed” prior to trial).

52.

Ctr. for Prosecutor Integrity, An Epidemic of Prosecutor
Misconduct 8, 13–14 app. B (2013). United States cases were measured
from 1963 to 2003 and made up about 66% of the cases in the study. The
states included in the study were Arizona (2002–2013), California (1997–
2011), New York (2004–2008), Pennsylvania (2004–2008), and Texas
(2004–2008). Id. at 13–14 app. B.

53.

18 U.S.C. § 242; Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law, U.S. Dep’t
of Just., https://www.justice.gov/crt/deprivation-rights-under-color-law
[https://perma.cc/X435-9QNY] (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).

54.

E.g., Price v. State Bar, 638 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Cal. 1982) (noting that a
prosecutor had faced a felony charge under state law for falsifying and
destroying evidence favorable to a defendant).
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§ 242,55 and only six prosecutors in the 20th century have been criminally charged.56
3.

Civil Liability

Because we cannot always trust the internal systems to provide a
remedy to government actors’ misconduct, Congress created a civilrights cause of action. When state actors violate a citizen’s constitutional rights, that citizen can bring a civil action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.57
Section 1983 . . . creates a claim for legal or equitable relief
against (1) every “person” who (2) “under color of” state legislation, custom, or usage (3) “subjects, or causes [another] to be
subjected” (4) to the deprivation of rights secured by the federal
“Constitution and laws.”58

However, prosecutors cannot be sued under § 1983 because they
have absolute immunity (also called “prosecutorial immunity”).
Prosecutorial immunity is a complete bar that prevents a plaintiff from
pursuing a civil suit against a prosecutor. It does not matter how
egregious their conduct or malicious their intent, officials with absolute
immunity cannot be held accountable in a § 1983 action.59
C.

History Repeating Itself and the Purpose of § 1983—When
the Government is Not Playing Fair, We Have a Right to
Hold Them Accountable

The legislature created § 1983 claims to give victims a remedy when
state actors violate individual constitutional rights. Following the Civil
War and the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments, Southern states continued to violate the rights of Black
people.60 By early 1871, despite repeated attempts to force Southern
states to protect the rights of Black people, evidence consistently
showed that state and local officials in the South were “fostering
vigilante terrorism” against Black people who attempted to exercise
their new rights.61 Congress passed what is now known as 42 U.S.C.
55.

Brian M. Murray, Jon B. Gould & Paul Heaton, Berkeley L.,
Piercing Prosecutorial Immunity Through Brady Claims 9 (2021)
(citing In re Brophy, 442 N.Y.S.2d 818 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).

56.

Id.

57.

Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Elizabeth J. Norman, Civil Rights Law
and Practice 46 (2d ed. 2001).

58.

Id. (alteration in original).

59.

Lewis & Norman, supra note 57, at 48, 60.

60.

See Developments in the Law—Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv.
L. Rev. 1133, 1141–42 (1977).

61.

Id. at 1153.
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§ 1983 after states refused to punish the Ku Klux Klan for their crimes
against Black people.62 Section 1983 was originally passed as part of
the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, a federal remedy to hold state
actors accountable for violating people of color’s rights.63 As long as
prosecutors are “state actors,” victims of prosecutorial misconduct
should be able to use § 1983 to hold prosecutors accountable and to
get relief.

II. Why Absolute Immunity is Destroying Our
Judicial System
A.

Section 1983 Does Not Recognize Absolute Immunity
for Prosecutors

Despite the availability of § 1983’s cause of action, the Supreme
Court has made it impossible for victims of prosecutorial misconduct to
get relief. In Imbler v. Pachtman, 64 the leading case on prosecutorial
misconduct, the Supreme Court declared that prosecutors have absolute
immunity from any causes of action that stem from performing their
official duties.65
The Supreme Court overstepped its authority by granting prosecutors absolute immunity. There is no basis for creating prosecutorial
immunity in the plain text of § 1983, and despite what the Court
claims, there is also no common-law basis for prosecutorial immunity.66
The Court, however, disputes this lack of foundation through conclusory and ill-informed arguments; it claims that because of § 1983’s
silence on immunity, absolute immunity is incorporated into the statute.67 The Court argues that absolute immunity existed at common law,
so if Congress wanted § 1983 to abrogate the immunity, then Congress
would have explicitly written it out.68 However, the Court’s history is
inaccurate—a misgiving the late Justice Scalia ardently spoke out
about.69 Prosecutors did not get absolute immunity at common law
62.

Lewis & Norman, supra note 57, at 45.

63.

Id. (citing Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.); Section 1983
and Federalism, supra note 60, at 1141–42.

64.

424 U.S. 409 (1976).

65.

Id. at 430–31.

66.

Jay Schweikert, Qualified Immunity: A Legal, Practical, and Moral
Failure, Cato Institute (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.cato.org/policyanalysis/qualified-immunity-legal-practical-moral-failure [https://perma.cc/
E8ZQ-BXEA]; Samantha M. Caspar & Artem M. Joukov, The Case for
Abolishing Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity on Equal Protections
Grounds, 49 Hofstra L. Rev. 315, 320 (2021).

67.

Imbler, 424 U.S. at 418 (referring to legislative immunity).

68.

Id. at 418, 422–23.

69.

Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 132–33 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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because the concept of prosecutorial immunity was not invented until
1896, twenty-five years after § 1983 was passed.70
When Congress passed § 1983, private, non-governmental
prosecutors were the norm in most states. Victims and their families
would prosecute their offenders either themselves or by hiring a private
attorney to lead the prosecution on their behalf.71 And even the states
that did have public prosecutors did not recognize prosecutorial
immunity. For instance, in Parker v. Huntington,72 which took place
before the passage of § 1983, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court sustained a tort action against a district attorney after the
attorney used false testimony to convict a defendant.73
Parker goes directly against the common-law understanding that
the Supreme Court espoused in Imbler: Parker acknowledged that
public prosecutors may be liable in actions of malicious prosecution for
their misconduct as prosecutors. 74 There is no contrary evidence at
common law that shows prosecutors used absolute immunity to escape
liability for malicious prosecution before Congress passed § 1983. 75
Absolute immunity for prosecutorial misconduct developed years after
1871. And when most states had a public prosecutor, there was no
common understanding among the courts about when or if immunity
applied to prosecutors. Indeed, the Court has acknowledged that the
absence of an equivalent common-law immunity precludes the recognition and application of new immunities today.76
Common law did recognize absolute judicial immunity but only
extended it to individuals who served as neutral parties helping to
resolve a legal dispute.77 Public officials who made decisions that did
not involve adjudication were given “quasi-judicial” immunity—better
known today as “qualified immunity.”78 There is evidence of prosecutors
having protection “more akin to ‘quasi-judicial immunity,’ which was

70.

See John H. Langbein, The Origins of Public Prosecution at Common
Law, 17 Am. J. Legal Hist. 313, 316 (1973); Taddei, supra note 38, at
1900–01; Johns, supra note 8, at 54–57; Kalina, 522 U.S. at 123, n. 11.

71.

Johns, supra note 8, at 108–09.

72.

Parker v. Huntington, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 124 (1854).

73.

Id. at 125, 128.

74.

Id.

75.

Kalina, 522 U.S. 132–33 (Scalia, J., concurring).

76.

See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 493 (1991) (determining that prosecutors
are not entitled to immunity when providing advice to police because no
such immunity existed at common law).

77.

Kalina, 522 U.S. at 132 (Scalia, J., concurring).

78.

Id.
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not absolute and could be overcome by proving malice.”79 Therefore,
the judiciary had absolute immunity at common law, but prosecutors
did not.
Justice White, in his concurrence in Imbler, argued that absolute
immunity should not shield prosecutors from claims of unconstitutional
prosecution.80 He explored the common-law understanding of prosecutorial immunity and concluded that absolute immunity should apply
only in narrow cases—those where a prosecutor is being accused of
bringing an improper charge. But when the claim is of “unconstitutional
suppression of evidence,” prosecutors ought to receive only qualified
immunity. 81 Justice White recognized the threat that the Imbler
decision would pose to our Constitution. He stated that absolute
immunity “would threaten to injure the judicial process and to interfere
with Congress’ purpose in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983, without any
support in statutory language or history.”82
The Court in Imbler glossed over the weak historical evidence of
prosecutorial immunity at common law.83 Because it believed the policy
reasons underlying judicial immunity for judges applied with equal force
to prosecutors, the Court used its discretion to intentionally stretch
absolute immunity to shield prosecutors.84 To justify this extension, the
Court opined that anything short of absolute immunity would “prevent
the vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor’s duty that is
essential to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system.”85
Rather than stay within its judicial role, the Court enacted its own
public-policy preferences by essentially reading new provisions into
§ 1983. Without textual or historical support, the Court cannot justify
its grant of immunity—it is a clear violation of the separation of powers
doctrine. Congress’ intent is clear: prosecutors should be held liable for
prosecutorial misconduct and victims should use § 1983 as the vehicle
that holds them accountable.

79.

Taddei, supra note 38, at 1901 (quoting Burns, 500 U.S. at 500–01 (Scalia
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).

80.

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 441–45 (1976) (White, J., concurring).

81.

Id. at 441–42.

82.

Id. at 433.

83.

See id. at 421 (majority opinion) (purporting to undertake “a considered
inquiry into the immunity historically accorded [to prosecutors] at
common law” but beginning that inquiry with an 1896 Indiana case).

84.

Id. at 422–27.

85.

Id. at 427–28.
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B.

Municipal Liability Falls Short of Honoring the Purpose of § 1983

The Court’s policy decision completely stripped away the remedial
purpose of § 1983 with respect to prosecutors. 86 The “fundamental
purpose” of § 1983 “is to provide compensatory relief to those deprived
of their federal rights by state actors.”87 Another potential avenue to
compensation—suing the state that employs the prosecutor—is foreclosed by the Court’s interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, which
grants states sovereign immunity.88
One way for a victim of prosecutorial misconduct to receive
compensation under § 1983 is by bringing suit against the prosecutor’s
office. 89 However, municipalities are not subject to a respondeat
superior theory of liability. A municipality can only be sued if it did
something directly or indirectly to allow the constitutional violation.90
In Monell v. Department of Social Services, the Court held that
municipalities can be held liable for constitutional violations, but added
the crippling caveat that municipalities are only liable if the violation
is an “official policy” or “custom” of the municipality.91 Subsequent
cases recognized two other theories of municipal liability: failure to
adequately screen job applicants92 and—the theory at issue in Connick
v. Thompson—failure to train municipal employees. 93 To hold a
municipality liable for its failure to train employees, a plaintiff must
demonstrate the municipality’s deliberate indifference—meaning that
the exact violation at issue was committed in the past, in the same way,
and with enough frequency that it was equivalent to an official policy.94
For example, in the formative case of Connick v. Thompson, the
Court held that, for a municipality to be liable for a Brady violation,
the violation at issue—which “involved failure to disclose blood evidence, a crime lab report, or physical or scientific evidence”—needed to
86.

Taddei, supra note 38, at 1903.

87.

Id. at 1909 (first quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469,
481 (1986); and then quoting Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 141 (1988)).

88.

The Eleventh Amendment restricts § 1983 actions brought against states.
Lewis & Norman, supra note 57, at 206 & n.69.

89.

Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 54 (2011); see also Monell v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 694–95 (1978) (holding that a municipality
is a “person” and can be sued).

90.

Monell, 436 U.S. at 694–95.

91.

Id. at 690–91, 694; Mark C. Niles, Here’s a More Important Reform Than
Ending Qualified Immunity, Lawfare (May 18, 2021, 2:13 PM), https://
www.lawfareblog.com/heres-more-important-reform-ending-qualifiedimmunity [https://perma.cc/ZDZ7-53HV].

92.

Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409–410 (1997).

93.

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388–92 (1989).

94.

Levine & Schwartz, supra note 3 (discussing Monell and Connick).

852

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 3·2022
The Next Step in Civil Rights

have happened often enough to constitute a pattern.95 Without that
pattern, the municipality could not be held liable.96 As some commentators have noted, the Court’s ruling effectively meant that
Connick would have to be put on notice [that he] need[ed] not
only to instruct his attorneys about the requirements of Brady,
but also to instruct his attorneys about Brady obligations as they
applied to [scientific] evidence [as distinct from evidence that
Thompson did not match police descriptions of the suspect]. This
parsing of past Brady violations makes no sense. Brady obligations do not attach differently to different types of evidence—
prosecutors are obligated to turn over all exculpatory evidence,
no matter the type.97

By continually moving the ball and creating these detailed
requirements, the Court makes it almost impossible for any plaintiff to
receive compensation for the very real and harmful violations that
prosecutors commit under the supervision of their respective district
attorneys’ offices.
While § 1983’s fundamental purpose is to offer a remedy to
individuals who have suffered constitutional violations caused by their
own governments, that is not its only purpose. In Imbler, the Court
discussed the additional purposes of § 1983 as both remedial and
deterrent in nature. But if victims cannot prevail under § 1983,
prosecutors have little incentive to stop violating constitutional rights.
Culturally, prosecutorial misconduct permeates the field, but
forcing municipalities to pay damages does not deter the individual
prosecutors who are committing the misconduct. Even if a § 1983
plaintiff has a case strong enough that the prosecutor’s office cannot
use the Monell doctrine as an affirmative defense and the plaintiff
succeeds on the merits, this result would have little effect on the
prosecutors who are engaging in the misconduct.98 Municipalities do not
respond to misconduct by disciplining rulebreakers. Municipalities focus
on making changes that will benefit them politically—disciplining has
too much red tape surrounding it to be an effective political tool.99
Thus, punishing prosecutors’ employers and municipalities does not
rectify the issue—the change must come by punishing prosecutors as
95.

Connick, 563 U.S. at 62–63, 71–72.

96.

Id. at 71–72. Although the Canton Court had left open the possibility that
a single act could demonstrate deliberate indifference, Connick did not
qualify. Id.

97.

Levine & Schwartz, supra note 3.

98.

Alexandra White Dunahoe, Revisiting the Cost-Benefit Calculus of the
Misbehaving Prosecutor: Deterrence Economics and Transitory Prosecutors,
61 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 45, 60–61, 64, 66 (2005).

99.

Id. at 65–66.
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individuals.100 Individual prosecutors are the problem; the solution to
prosecutorial misconduct lies in harming their interests through personalized punishments. Prosecutors are motivated by professional gain, and
being labeled a crooked prosecutor who is a liability to employers would
undoubtedly hinder that interest.101
In order to give effect to the full purpose of § 1983, there must be
a penalty for misconduct and that penalty must address the many lowlevel prosecutors who contribute to the systemic problem.102 Only after
their careers are threatened will prosecutors prone to misconduct think
twice before coercing a witness, hiding evidence, or otherwise harming
a defendant’s right to a fair trial.103
C.

Qualified Immunity Is Not an Alternative Solution

Qualified immunity is the other form of immunity available to some
state actors, and the level of immunity that Justice White’s concurrence
in Imbler considered proper for prosecutorial misconduct.104 Qualified
immunity is not the appropriate type of immunity for prosecutorial
misconduct; it is a weakly supported doctrine that both sides of the
aisle have criticized.105 The current state of qualified immunity is Court
created.106 In Monroe v. Pape,107 the Supreme Court broadly authorized
§ 1983 suits against state officials who violate individual constitutional
rights, even if their violation was unauthorized by state law.108 Monroe
did not discuss any immunities available to state officials under § 1983
actions. Following Monroe, the Court created the common-law
affirmative defense of qualified immunity in Pierson v. Ray. 109 The

100. Id. at 64–66.
101. Id. at 60–61, 64, 66 (employing a cost-benefit analysis to explore the ways
to improve the effectiveness of deterrents by customizing them to groups
and their incentives).
102. Id. at 55, 64–66.
103. See id. 55, 60–61.
104. See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text.
105. Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: Time to Change the Message, 93
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1887, 1889–91(2018).
106. Lewis & Norman, supra note 57, at 56 (“Section 1983 today is almost
entirely a judicial construct. . . . After the Court’s most recent ministrations, this historic statute of sweeping potential application yields an odd
and desiccated residue. . . . [T]he individual defendant’s qualified immunity
absolves him from liability for even an intentionally inflicted constitutional
harm, so long as his conduct was not clearly and specifically prohibited
by a prior decision.”).
107. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
108. Id. at 168–69, 171–72.
109. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555, 557 (1967).
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Court held that police officers were entitled to qualified immunity for
arrests made with “good faith and probable cause.”110
Since Pierson, the Supreme Court, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 111
changed the test for qualified immunity and completely gutted § 1983
by making the defense of qualified immunity almost impenetrable.112
Before Harlow, the Court espoused a subjective “good faith” requirement, so qualified immunity would not shield officers who did not have
a good-faith belief that their conduct was lawful. The Harlow Court
eliminated the “good faith” test and replaced it with a purely objective
test that gives police officers qualified immunity if “their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.”113 Therefore, even if
they act with subjective malice, qualified immunity will apply unless
prior case law shows that the conduct at issue is unconstitutional.114
The way the Court has interpreted the “clearly established” standard is extremely stringent. Mere generalities do not satisfy the
standard; instead the standard requires a high level of factual similarity
to a previous case. Because of the extreme particularity requirement,
most plaintiffs will fail in defeating the defense.115
The other major issue with the standard is that the Supreme Court
has allowed lower courts to dismiss cases using qualified immunity
without developing the law.116 Originally, the Court mandated that,
when deciding cases with a qualified immunity defense, courts should
apply a two-pronged test: the court must first decide whether a
constitutional right has been violated and then decide whether the violation was clearly established.117 If lower courts followed this mandate,
there would be a rich library of “clearly established” constitutional
violations, so that even if one officer is entitled to qualified immunity
110. Id. at 554–57; see also Scott A. Keller, Qualified and Absolute Immunity
at Common Law, 73 Stan. L. Rev. 1337, 1342 & n.18, 1353–54, 1354
n.97 (2021).
111. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
112. Id. at 817–18; see also Keller, supra note 110, at 1388, 1392–93.
113. Harlow, 457 U.S at 816–18.
114. See id. at 815, 817–18.
115. Jay R. Schweikert, Qualified Immunity: A Legal, Practical, and Moral
Failure 1, 6–7 (Cato Inst., Policy Analysis No. 901, 2020), https://www.
cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2020-09/pa-901-update.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9GFR-M9WU].
116. Blum, supra note 105, at 1893–95.
117. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001) (“[T]he first inquiry must
be whether a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts
alleged; second, assuming the violation is established, the question whether
the right was clearly established must be considered on a more specific
level than recognized by the Court of Appeals.”).
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for siccing a police dog on an unarmed man with his hands in the air,
the next officer who does will be liable for the constitutional violation.118
But the Court eliminated this requirement that courts address each
prong in order because deciding the first question takes up too many
judicial resources. 119 The Court reasoned that tackling the second
question is less wasteful because if the law is not clearly established,
then there is no effect on the instant case.120 Lower courts have taken
this grant and created a catch-22 situation; courts will avoid deciding
whether constitutional violations occurred and dismiss the case because
the conduct at issue did not violate clearly established law. This pattern
ensures that no clearly established law is created.121 The result is that
qualified immunity is a failed doctrine that counteracts the purpose of
§ 1983 by depriving victims of a remedy. Through the decisions discussed above, the Court has transformed qualified immunity unilaterally, without a legislative grant.122
If the Supreme Court instead applied qualified immunity as it
existed at common law—allowing a claim of bad faith to defeat qualified
immunity—then qualified immunity might function in a way that gives
full effect to § 1983. As it works currently, even if prosecutors were
entitled only to qualified—rather than absolute—immunity, a § 1983
suit against crooked prosecutors would be unlikely to result in any
accountability.

III. Why Abolishing Immunity is the Best Way to
Deter Prosecutorial Misconduct and Provide a
Remedy to Victims
A.

The Environment Prosecutors Operate in Justifies Less Immunity
Than Other Public Officials

Even if qualified immunity were an effective and fair policy, it
should not apply to prosecutors. This Part shows that several factors
support depriving prosecutors of any immunity for their misconduct:
118. See Baxter v. Bracey, 751 F. App’x 869, 872 (6th Cir. 2018);
Schweikert, supra note 115, at 7–9 (discussing Baxter).
119. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 236, 242–43 (2009) (holding that
lower federal courts do not need to follow the “rigid” analysis demanded
by Saucier v. Katz, and making the “merits” analysis in prong one of the
qualified-immunity defense discretionary).
120. Id. at 236–37.
121. Blum, supra note 105, at 1893–97.
122. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 611–12 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 442 (1976) (White,
J., concurring) (“It should hardly need stating that, ordinarily, liability
in damages for unconstitutional or otherwise illegal conduct has the very
desirable effect of deterring such conduct. Indeed, that was precisely the
proposition upon which § 1983 was enacted.”).
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prosecutors’ opportunities to make thoughtful decisions, the relative
secrecy in which prosecutorial misconduct takes place, prosecutors’
incentives to win cases, and the disproportionate impact their
misconduct has on people of color.
1.

Police vs. Prosecutors: Snap Judgments or Reasoned
Decision-making?

Qualified immunity applies to all government officials who do not
get absolute immunity,123 but not all government officials carry guns or
have the power to manipulate evidence and imprison people.124 Because
both police and prosecutors hold great amounts of power, some
commentators point to the similarities between them to advocate for
giving prosecutors qualified, rather than absolute, immunity.125 Prosecutors certainly should not get a heightened immunity that police do
not get, and in fact there are differences that support prosecutors
getting less immunity.
Those who support maintaining qualified immunity as a defense for
officers describe rationales that are superficially reasonable,126 however,
those rationales do not make sense in the context of prosecutors.
Prosecutors are afforded a safe environment and all the time and
information that they need to make well-thought-out decisions.127 But
when those decisions are wrong, they are always immune from suit.
Police officers, by contrast, often need to make rapid decisions in highstress situations that are life or death.128 Even though officers often
make these decisions under duress, people are able to sue them for clear
federal-law violations under § 1983.129 This difference supports giving
prosecutors less, not more, immunity.
Further, police officers do not receive the comprehensive education
that lawyers do. Officers receive basic training and learn on the job,
and while some officers may be able to recall the legal standards that
will be used to judge their actions in life-threatening situations, many

123. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806–07 (noting that all
government officials are entitled to either absolute or qualified immunity).
124. See Ian Millhiser, Qualified Immunity, Explained, Vox (Jun. 3, 2020, 8:00
AM), https://www.vox.com/2020/6/3/21277104/end-qualified-immunitypolice-definition-george-floyd [https://perma.cc/G64E-LEVA]; The Power
of Prosecutors, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/smart-justice/
prosecutorial-reform/power-prosecutors [https://perma.cc/FFY6-ZCWG]
(last visited Jan. 23, 2022); supra notes 27–33 and accompanying text.
125. Caspar & Joukov, supra note 66, at 375–76.
126. See id. at 358.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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are unable to.130 There is no excuse for police misconduct, but the law
can factor in the extent to which situational factors muddle an officer’s
ability to control the outcome.131
Lawyers go to law school for three years, pass a bar examination,
and then receive on-the-job training about the current state of criminal
law.132 Ignorance is no excuse, but even if it were, when it comes to
prosecutors, they should not be able to claim unfamiliarity with the
law.133 The law does not need to accommodate the unique difficulties
prosecutors face because prosecutors are better positioned to understand which of their decisions might violate federal rights.
None of the policy reasons that justify police immunity apply to
prosecutorial immunity. 134 As explained earlier, courts give police
leeway because they often make decisions under dire circumstances, and
therefore, courts cannot analyze their misconduct under a rational lens.
We do not expect police officers to choose between their safety and
potential internal penalties. 135 This difficult choice never applies to
prosecutors.136 When prosecutors engage in misconduct, the analysis is
much clearer. Prosecutors defy the law and Constitution to win a case
because they believe they are protecting the public from “bad actors”
or because they want to further their careers; there are no external
factors that courts should give weight to in analyzing whether to
penalize a prosecutor. We do not need to cut prosecutors slack—follow
the rules of fairness and the worst outcome is a lost case.
2.

Judges vs. Prosecutors: Why Prosecutorial Misconduct’s Invisibility
Requires Strong Deterrents

Prosecutorial misconduct is particularly damaging because it is
often kept secret from defendants and there is no easy way to shed light
on it. This difference alone justifies separating prosecutors from other
state actors who are afforded immunities. It is not only the unique
power that prosecutors hold that justifies differentiating their roles from
other government roles, it is also the manner in which prosecutorial
misconduct is committed.

130. Id. at 363–64.
131. Cf. Lange Eldridge, Understanding the Officer–Prosecutor Divide, Police
1 (Oct. 15, 2010), https://www.police1.com/legal/articles/understandingthe-officer-prosecutor-divide-NKLsp5aiNjBDLCyr/ [https://perma.cc/
7G2X-CJUM] (describing how officers engage with the law differently than
prosecutors do).
132. Caspar & Joukov, supra note 66, at 358–59, 363.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 358.
135. See id. at 358–59, 362, 364.
136. See id. at 358–59, 362.

858

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 3·2022
The Next Step in Civil Rights

Comparing prosecutorial misconduct to judicial misconduct
illustrates why the former should be treated differently. Judges and
prosecutors overlap in a lot of meaningful ways. Both act on behalf of
the government and both are—at least ostensibly—committed to justice.137 In Imbler, the Court used the policies backing judicial immunity
to justify prosecutorial immunity, but the Court’s logic there ignored
the differences between the roles.138
Judicial misconduct frequently takes the form of openly berating
and demeaning the intelligence of the defense and the prosecution.139
Another form of possible judicial misconduct was discussed in the media
coverage of the highly publicized 2021 murder trial of Kyle Rittenhouse.140 In the Rittenhouse case, the judge brought the jury into the
courtroom and then had the jury applaud the single veteran in the
room—who coincidentally was the defense’s first witness of the day.141
Some legal experts argued that was not an act of neutrality by the
judge, and that the act likely biased the jury in favor of the witness.142
But other legal experts did not believe the judge’s actions crossed the
line into misconduct.143 Scholarship detailing the misconduct of judges
137. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420, 422–23 (1976) (“The commonlaw immunity of a prosecutor is based upon the same considerations that
underlie the common-law immunities of judges and grand jurors acting
within the scope of their duties.”).
138. See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text.
139. See Alschuler, supra note 39, at 681–84.
140. Nick Niedzwiadek, Judge Shares the Spotlight in Kyle Rittenhouse Trial,
Politico (Nov. 16, 2021, 7:45 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/
2021/11/16/judge-schroeder-kyle-rittenhouse-trial-522772 [https://perma.cc/
9LZ8-2QX2]. Rittenhouse was charged with “first-degree intentional homicide,
first-degree reckless homicide, attempted first-degree intentional homicide
and first-degree recklessly endangering public safety.” Id. Rittenhouse was
charged after he crossed state lines, violated a curfew, and carried a
firearm at the age of seventeen to watch over a Black Lives Matter
protest. Barbara McQuade, The Kyle Rittenhouse Verdict Makes Us All
Less Safe, Time (Nov. 19, 2021, 5:54 PM), https://time.com/6122142/
kyle-rittenhouse-verdict/ [https://perma.cc/84Q3-B3D4]. Rittenhouse killed
two men and injured another, but was acquitted after he argued that he
acted in self-defense. Id.
141. Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, In Scrutinized Kyle Rittenhouse Trial, It’s the
Judge Commanding Attention, N.Y. Times, https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/11/11/us/kyle-rittenhouse-judge-bruce-schroeder.html [https://
perma.cc/86RP-U3V9] (Nov. 15, 2021).
142. Id.
143. Kathleen Foody, Rittenhouse Judge’s Nod to Veterans Includes Defense
Witness, AP News (Nov. 11, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/kylerittenhouse-wisconsin-kenosha-homicide-0f514cc4c04762bf42cccb5f2473b76c
[https://perma.cc/YV2U-DW43] (“For some trial observers, [defense
counsel’s] opening was a clear mistake that could have swayed jurors’
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often focuses on inappropriate remarks which bias the jury against a
party.144 While a judge’s every action and word has the potential to
impact during a trial, a judge’s human influence is not always grounds
for misconduct.145
Judicial misconduct does not have the same shroud of secrecy that
a prosecutor has when hiding evidence from the opposing party. 146
Instead, it occurs in plain view of anyone in the courtroom; this gives
attorneys the opportunity to intervene before too much damage is
done—a safeguard that does not apply to prosecutorial misconduct.147
Bitter and bad-intentioned comments also do not have the same unfair
impact of a prosecutor coercing a witness or hiding evidence.148 When
judges neglect their duty to be wholly neutral, they harm the justice
system, but it is out in the open, allowing each party to proceed with
appeals as necessary.149
The late Judge Julius Hoffman presided over the famous trial of the
Chicago Seven, which is a case of egregious judicial misconduct and
provides an example of how it can be remedied.150 Following the trial of
the Chicago Seven, Judge Hoffman was heavily criticized by the public,
the Seventh Circuit where he sat, and the legal community at large.151
His misconduct during the trial is too extensive to list, but in essence,
he made the defendants look like dishonest criminals while also making
absurd rulings that denied defendants their right to a fair trial. 152
opinion of a defense witness at the expense of prosecutors’ already shaky
case. But other watchers shrugged it off, suggesting prosecutors were best
served letting the moment pass without objection.”) (emphasis added).
144. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 39, at 681–85.
145. See Jonathan Wolf, Cut Kyle Rittenhouse Judge Some Slack, The Judicial
Conduct Code Doesn’t Prohibit Having a Personality, Above the L.
(Nov. 17, 2021, 11:18 AM), https://abovethelaw.com/2021/11/cut-kylerittenhouse-judge-some-slack-the-judicial-conduct-code-doesnt-prohibithaving-a-personality/ [https://perma.cc/P8SX-Y7VQ].
146. See Alschuler, supra note 39, at 694.
147. See Cynthia Gray, The Line Between Legal Error and Judicial
Misconduct: Balancing Judicial Independence and Accountability, 32
Hofstra L. Rev. 1245, 1249, 1256, 1263–65, 1275 (2004) (describing
common forms of judicial misconduct, including inappropriate demeanor,
refusal to exercise jurisdiction, and repeated error, all of which occur with
the knowledge of interested litigants).
148. See Wolf, supra note 145.
149. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text; see also Alschuler, supra
note 39, at 685–87, 690.
150. Bennett L. Gershman, Judging Judges Fifty Years After—Was Judge
Julius Hoffman’s Conduct So Different?, 50 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 839, 839–
42 (2019).
151. Id. at 839–41.
152. Id. at 840–41.

860

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 3·2022
The Next Step in Civil Rights

Notably, Bobby Seale, the single Black defendant, repeatedly requested
to represent himself as allowed by the Sixth Amendment, and he was
repeatedly denied this right by Judge Hoffman.153 Hoffman also ordered
Seale to be bound and gagged and brought him in front of the jury.154
After the defendants were convicted, they filed appeals and won because
of the many prejudicial decisions Hoffman made.155 Judicial review is
not a perfect remedy, or even a sufficient one, because it often fails to
correct the biases that impede a fair trial, but it can provide an avenue
for correction in almost every case in which it occurs.156
It is nearly impossible to apply the same remedy to prosecutorial
misconduct because there is no way of shedding light on most instances
of prosecutorial misconduct. “It is very difficult to find proof of
misconduct that by definition is designed to stay hidden—especially
when prosecutors hold so much power to control access to what’s in
their files and to witnesses.”157 How is a defendant supposed to know
they should appeal their case because of bad conduct when they have
almost no way of detecting the bad conduct?
3.

Prosecutors and the Winning-Is-Everything Mindset

Prosecutors are under immense pressure to win, which necessitates
the strongest incentives possible to deter prosecutorial misconduct.
Roger King, a prosecutor in Philadelphia who served from 1973 to 2008,
earned himself the reputation of being “the best.” 158 King held this
reputation even though he was notorious for using illegal tactics to lock
up innocent people. 159 As the “King of Deathrow,” King put more
people on death row than anyone else—approximately thirty people.160
The court of appeals in King’s district repeatedly flagged him for
prosecutorial misconduct. “At least seven of his murder convictions have
been overturned amid allegations that he made improper statements in
court, hid exculpatory evidence, or manipulated witnesses by intimidation, threats, or undisclosed benefits.”161 Despite the notoriety of King’s
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 840 n.6, 841 n.11, 842.
156. See id. at 842 (noting that although convictions are often upheld despite
judicial misconduct, the appellate system remains open to review trial
judge conduct and “occasionally corrects the most flagrant abuses”).
157. Zack, supra note 9.
158. Samantha Melamed, King of Death Row, The Phila. Inquirer (Nov. 11,
2021), https://www.inquirer.com/crime/a/roger-king-philadelphia-daconviction-reversals-20211111.html [https://perma.cc/9D9W-NUB9].
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.

861

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 3·2022
The Next Step in Civil Rights

misconduct, neither the court nor the prosecutor’s officer ever disciplined
him. People in the district attorney’s office did not care if King violated
the Constitution because he was a winner.162
A former DA commented on King’s actions, claiming it was not
necessarily a pattern of misconduct, but rather the effect of King being
overzealous.163 To have a former prosecutor react to King’s constitutional violations with praise and excuses demonstrates how broken the
system is. His reputation for misconduct dates back to his first few
years at the office. It is unknown how many innocent people he locked
away, but the Philadelphia DA’s office knows that if they see a case
was handled by King, they should assume misconduct.164
Of course, not all prosecutors cheat and break the law, just like
not all lawyers cheat and break the law. But some do. And everyone in
an adversarial system wants to win. Our system’s safeguards against
prosecutorial misconduct need to adjust to this. Prosecutors are just
lawyers who are trying to get convictions.165 They are under enormous
pressure, both internal and external, to win every case they try.166 This
need to win can come at the expense of a fair trial.167
Capital cases are so political that winning becomes far more
important for the average D.A. . . . We’re not talking about
being competitive. We’re talking about winning at all costs.
Deliberately deceiving the court. Withholding favorable evidence.
Arguing things they know aren’t true. Harassing defense witnesses. Concealing deals they make with their witnesses. Winning
means getting a death sentence. They are out to win.168

This combination of invisibility, incentives, and access creates an
environment ripe for misconduct. There are dozens of studies covering

162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert, Comment, It is Not Whether You Win or
Lose, It Is How You Play the Game: Is the Win-Loss Scorekeeping
Mentality Doing Justice for Prosecutors?, 38 Cal. W. L. Rev. 283, 289–
96 (describing the incentives that prosecutors have to win and how those
incentives affect their prosecutorial behaviors).
166. Melamed, supra note 158.
167. See id.
168. Christopher John Farley & James Willwerth, Dead Teen Walking, Time,
Jan. 19, 1998, at 50 (quoting an attorney from the Loyola Resource
Center) (examining the case of Shareef Cousin).
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the span of 1932 to 2018 that show the prevalence of serious prosecutorial misconduct. 169 Prosecutors have no reason to stop, so the
legislature must step up and give them a reason to stop.
4.

The Harmonious System of Oppression: How History Repeats Itself

Failing to deter prosecutorial misconduct disproportionately
impacts people of color. Mirroring how police officers arrest, attack, and
kill Black people at higher rates than white people,170 prosecutors hide
evidence, coerce witnesses, and imprison innocent Black people more
than white people.171 Just like anything “that has to do with criminal
justice in the United States, race is the big factor.”172
Roger King’s misconduct disproportionately imprisoned innocent
Black and Latino people. During his thirty-two years in the
Philadelphia DA’s office, most of the people King prosecuted were
Black or Latino.173 King himself was a Black man, but that apparently
did not offset the racial bias that often influences prosecutorial decisions

169. Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005
BYU L. Rev. 53, 62 (referring to a book by a professor at Yale Law
cataloguing sixty-five cases of wrongful convictions).
170. The Chicago Police Department uses force “almost 10 times more often
against [B]lacks than whites.” Paul Solotaroff, The Untouchables: An
Investigation into the Violence of the Chicago Police, Rolling Stone
(Nov. 19, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culturefeatures/chicago-police-racism-violence-history-1088559/ [https://perma.cc/
JB4N-K4NY]. Modeling predicts 1 in 1,000 Black males will be killed by
police compared to 39 in 100,000 white males. Frank Edwards, Hedwig
Lee, & Michael Esposito, Proc. of the Nat’l Acad. of Scis. of
the U.S., Risk of Being Killed by Police Use of Force in the
United States by Age, Race–Ethnicity, and Sex (John Hagan ed.,
2019). Five percent of drug users are Black, but they make up twentynine percent of those arrested for drug offenses. Criminal Justice Fact
Sheet, NAACP, https://naacp.org/resources/criminal-justice-fact-sheet
(last visited Feb. 1, 2022) [https://perma.cc/8UXG-4RLF].
171. Ortiz, supra note 31 (discussing Possley et al., supra note 30, at iv);
see Maurice Possley & Klara Stephens, Nat’l Registry of
Exonerations, Race and Wrongful Convictions in the United
States 1 (2017), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/
Documents/Race_and_Wrongful_Convictions.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3DCK-FSGQ] (noting that Black people are convicted of crimes and later
found innocent at “three times their rate in the population”) .
172. Niraj Chokshi, Black People More Likely to Be Wrongfully Convicted of
Murder, Study Shows, N.Y. Times (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/03/07/us/wrongful-convictions-race-exoneration.html
[https://
perma.cc/C6BW-BAL9] (quoting Samuel R. Gross, University of Michigan
law professor).
173. Melamed, supra note 158; Chokshi, supra note 172.
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and leads to disproportionately convicting people of color.174 King, like
many other prosecutors, struck Black people from his jury list twice as
often as white people.175
Empirical research demonstrates that King was no exception:
Black defendants ‘were slightly more likely than white defendants
to be victims of official misconduct,’ by a margin of 57 percent to
52 percent. The disparity grew when it came to drug crimes (47
percent to 22 percent) and for murder cases, (78 percent to 64
percent). In exonerations involving death sentences, there was
misconduct in 87 percent of the cases involving Black defendants
compared with 68 percent for white defendants.176

In murder cases, “[B]lack defendants account for 40 percent of those
convicted of the crime, but 50 percent of those wrongfully convicted.”177
Prosecutorial misconduct like hiding evidence and manipulating witnesses “may also . . . contribute[] to the racial disparity.”178
The public heavily criticizes our justice system because police
officers frequently injure and kill Black citizens, all sanctioned by the
badge they wear on their chests. 179 Prosecutors’ role in imprisoning
innocent Black men is no less impactful. In the 1,632 exonerations that
resulted at least in part from prosecutorial misconduct since 1989, 52%
of the victims are Black. 180 A 2017 report reviewed exonerations
nationwide and found that Black people spent an average of three more
years in prison than white people following exonerations.181 There is
even evidence of prosecutors going after Black men while hiding evidence that the real criminal was white.182

174. Melamed, supra note 158; Rachel D. Godsil & HaoYang (Carl) Jiang,
Prosecuting Fairly: Addressing the Challenges of Implicit Bias, Racial
Anxiety, and Stereotype Threat, 40 Cal. Dist. Att’ys Ass’n Prosecutor’s
Brief 142, 146 (2018).
175. Melamed, supra note 158.
176. Ortiz, supra note 31 (discussing Possley et al., supra note 30).
177. Chokshi, supra note 172.
178. Id.
179. See Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter
May Be the Largest Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. Times (July 3, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protestscrowd-size.html [https://perma.cc/Y9N2-783G] (describing significant public
involvement in protesting police behavior).
180. % of Exonerations, supra note 27.
181. Chokshi, supra note 172.
182. Taddei, supra note 38, at 1897–98.
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The criminal justice system is designed to oppress Black people.183
Section 1983 was created as a direct response to combat those who use
their authority under the law to oppress U.S. citizens—particularly
newly free Black people in the wake of the Civil War.184 Yet these are
the civil-rights issues that continue to affect society today. The notion
that the law is colorblind has always been a false narrative.185 Many
aspects of the criminal justice system need to go through a complete
renovation, but remedying the part that prosecutors contribute is
simple. Prosecutors do not need absolute immunity to do the same
thing that every other lawyer does.
B.

Eliminating Prosecutorial Immunity Does Not Threaten
Honest Prosecutors

There are overwhelming policy considerations that far outweigh the
negative effects that eliminating absolute immunity would have on
prosecutors. Moreover, the Court greatly exaggerates the negative
effects that eliminating absolute immunity would likely have on
prosecutors.
The Court in Imbler was hyper-focused on the impact of misconduct
suits on the “honest prosecutor.”186 In an effort to protect the honest
prosecutor, the Court sacrificed the rights of people. Looking at the
conduct and abuse of prosecutors, abolishing immunity is not a threat
to honest prosecutors, it is a threat to those who violate the constitutional rights of others. The honest prosecutor is the same thing as the
honest lawyer. There is no reason why people can sue a defense attorney
for their actions in a courtroom but cannot sue a prosecutor for more
egregious misconduct.

183. Radley Balko, There’s Overwhelming Evidence that the Criminal Justice
System Is Racist. Here’s the Proof., Wash. Post (June 10, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/opinions/systemicracism-police-evidence-criminal-justice-system/ [https://perma.cc/D5XBJA2W]. Balko notes that:
When you consider that much of the criminal justice system was
built, honed and firmly established during the Jim Crow era . . .
this is pretty intuitive. The modern criminal justice system helped
preserve racial order . . . . For much of the early 20th century,
in some parts of the country, that was its primary function. That
it might retain some of those proclivities today shouldn’t be all
that surprising.
Id.
184. See supra Part I(C).
185. See Janel George, A Lesson on Critical Race Theory, ABA (Jan. 11, 2021),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_
magazine_home/civil-rights-reimagining-policing/a-lesson-on-criticalrace-theory/ [https://perma.cc/HZV6-XRFX].
186. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 425, 427–28 (1976).
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The Court based its decision to give prosecutors absolute immunity
on its belief that anything short of absolute immunity would (1) lead
to harassment in the form of unfounded litigation that would distract
prosecutors from their jobs, and (2) compromise prosecutors’ decisions
and damage their ability to exercise the “independence of judgment
required by public trust.”187 Neither of these policy reasons are serious
enough issues that justify blocking the relief § 1983 can offer the
prosecutorial-misconduct victims.
1.

There Is No Flood That Our Current System Cannot Handle

There are already strong tools in place to minimize unmeritorious
litigation. There is more research on eliminating qualified immunity
than absolute immunity, but the logic applies equally. One of the
country’s leading experts on qualified immunity, Joanna C. Schwartz,
analyzed the role qualified immunity played in 1,200 federal civil-rights
cases and predicted that this doomsday scenario of flooding courts with
frivolous litigation would not occur.188
Even if plaintiffs wanted to file frivolous litigation, they would be
hard-pressed to find an attorney who would help them. Most civil-rights
cases proceed on a contingency-fee basis, and an attorney would not
take a case if she does not believe there is a legal case to make.189 This
also means that de minimis constitutional violations would likely not
be litigated; attorneys usually take cases where the expected payout is
“greater than the anticipated litigation costs.” 190 The result is that
attorneys will likely file only cases with teeth and merit. Of course,
more cases to recover against individual prosecutors would survive a
motion to dismiss because the current number is zero, but more § 1983
cases—which, as constitutional disputes, fall squarely within courts’
competence—is not a reason to keep an unworkable precedent.
Even if a lawyer chose to take a meritless case, there are pleading
requirements that would prevent the case from moving forward and
wasting resources. 191 “Plaintiffs in these cases would still have to
overcome the same burdens of pleading, discovery, and proof that are
today the primary bases of dismissal.”192 To state a § 1983 action, the
plaintiff must show that: (1) the individual was exonerated from the
crime of prosecution;193 and (2) the prosecutor violated a constitutional
187. Id. at 423–24.
188. Joanna C. Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity, 120 Colum. L. Rev. 309,
315–16 (2020).
189. Id. at 345.
190. Id. at 346.
191. See Taddei, supra note 38, at 1904–05; see also Schwartz, supra note 188,
at 337.
192. Schwartz, supra note 188, at 337.
193. Heck v. Humphrey 512 U.S. 477, 484–87 (1994).
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right with a culpable state of mind.194 There is no consensus on how to
satisfy the second prong, but it is likely to look like the common law
malicious-prosecution cause of action described in Imbler.195 In Imbler,
the culpable state of mind had to be “malicious.”196 A prosecutor would
not be held responsible for what they knew and failed to act on or what
they should have known, they would only be held accountable for the
acts they individually committed that violated the Constitution.197
2.

The Only Independent Judgment That Is Compromised Is the
Decision to Violate the Constitution

Claiming that the threat of litigation will cloud prosecutors’
judgment is one of the weaker justifications the Court offered for
prosecutorial immunity. Plaintiffs cannot sue a prosecutor just for
bringing charges against them. The prosecutor has to do something that
violates the Constitution before a person can file a § 1983 suit.198 So if
the “independent judgment” that is harmed by abolishing prosecutorial
immunity is whether to hide the lab report that proves the defendant
is not the perpetrator or to follow the rules and give the defendant a
fair trial, then there is no hidden threat to democracy in removing
immunity.
It is clear that some prosecutors are willing to do whatever they
need to do in order to win. By giving defendants the option to hold
them accountable, the only chilling effect would be that crooked
prosecutors may actually start following the Constitution they have
pledged to honor. If the “honest” prosecutor overcorrects by sharing too
much evidence, that is not injurious to the judicial process.199 These
points were all brought up by Justice White in his concurrence in
Imbler. 200 By ignoring Justice White’s logic and creating absolute
immunity, the majority in Imbler made a conscious decision to sacrifice
the integrity of the justice system for the sake of efficiency.

194. Johns, supra note 169, at 128 (first citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis,
523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998); and then citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.
730, 736 (2002)); Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405
(1997) (“In any § 1983 suit, however, the plaintiff must establish the
state of mind required to prove the underlying violation.”).
195. Johns, supra note 169, at 130; Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 415–16
(1976).
196. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427; see also Imbler. 424 U.S. at 438 (White, J.,
concurring).
197. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427, 431 (majority opinion).
198. See supra notes 191–97 and accompanying text.
199. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 443 (White, J., concurring).
200. Id. at 439–40, 443–44.
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Conclusion
Lack of accountability is a sign of an unfair practice. Absolute
prosecutorial immunity runs completely contrary to the goals of the
criminal justice system and must be eliminated.201 This issue affects
everyone, but it disproportionately affects Black people. Police destroy
lives with little accountability and prosecutors destroy lives with no
accountability. When it comes to prosecutors, the law is protecting
state actors who do not need the protection. Prosecutors make their
decisions with full awareness of the immunity they have and of the
consequences their decisions have for others. Section 1983 does not
punish prosecutors for strategic legal decisions—there is nothing wrong
with smart legal tactics—only prosecutors who consider breaking the
law to be a “smart legal tactic” will be affected by eliminating
prosecutorial immunity.
The legislature created § 1983 as a way for people of color to hold
the people in power accountable when they used that power to violate
constitutional rights.202 One hundred fifty-one years later and we still
have a system that disproportionately mistreats people of color and a
Court that has stripped away the only vehicle for damages, and the
best deterrent against prosecutorial misconduct the people have. 203
Official misconduct echoes the conduct that prompted the legislature
to pass the Ku Klux Klan Act. 204 The legislature should recognize
absolute immunity for the injustice it is and abolish it.

201. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 442 (White. J., concurring). The issue of transparency
is beyond the scope of this comment, but there are several well-thought
out solutions addressing this issue, like open-evidence banks. See Eugene
Volokh, Judge Kozinski on Reforms that Can Help Prevent Prosecutorial
Misconduct, Wash. Post (Jul. 17, 2015, 2:05 PM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/07/17/judgekozinski-on-reforms-that-can-help-prevent-prosecutorial-misconduct/
[https://perma.cc/N8QZ-8RT3].
202. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text.
203. See supra Part II(A).
204. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text.
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The criminal justice system has changed since § 1983 originally
passed; namely, prosecutors are now advocates trying to further their
careers by winning every case they try, just like every other lawyer.
Yet, these advocates have inequitable access to information and people.
Not all prosecutors abuse their power, but abolishing absolute
immunity will not harm the honest prosecutor—it will only punish
those who have taken advantage of their power.
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